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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INTERACTIVE PRE-CLEARANCE DEVELOPMENT

KAREEM U. CRAYTON*
Congress spent relatively little time in 1965 discussing the “special
provisions” in the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), the federal law responsible for
America’s “Second Reconstruction.”1 Enacted to enforce the constitutional
rights to racial equality guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment, the VRA
dealt a final blow to the segregationist program of denying black voters access
to the ballot in the South.2 The law is often credited for prompting the
emergence of minority political participation and representation both in the
South and throughout the country.3
The most significant of these special provisions is contained in Section
Five of the VRA, which mandates that certain state and local governments seek
and obtain federal permission or “pre-clearance” before changing their election
rules and practices.4 The provision radically shifts the traditional balance

* Associate Professor of Law & Political Science, University of Southern California. A.B.
Harvard College, JD/PhD Stanford University. Special thanks to both Jeremy Lawrence and
Alexa Lawson-Remer for their very helpful assistance in researching this piece.
1. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, The Voting
Rights Act and Two Reconstructions in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 135, 135 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds. 1992).
2. See generally VLADIMIR ORLANDO KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION
(University of Tennessee Press 1984) (1949); STEVE LAWSON, RUNNING FOR FREEDOM: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN AMERICA SINCE 1941 56 (Temple University Press 1991).
3. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965 – 1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Groffman, eds., Princeton University Press
1994) (offering an empirical assessment of state level political advancement for minority
communities as a result of the VRA’s adoption and enforcement).
4. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting states from "deny[ing] or abridg[ing] the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color"). I describe the pre-clearance remedy at
greater length in later sections, but it is helpful to speak with some level of precision at this stage.
The term “pre-clearance” refers to the special remedy in the Voting Rights Act that “freezes”
existing voting laws in certain state or local jurisdictions with especially unfavorable records of
race discrimination in the electoral arena. In order to make changes to existing law, the
jurisdiction must receive permission from the Justice Department or the U.S. District Court in
Washington D.C. In either case, the state must show that its proposed change does not have the
319
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between state and federal power, yet this issue appeared only infrequently in
the congressional hearings and floor debates on the VRA.5 Public frustration
over the violence against civil rights marchers and the state evasion of federal
court orders by the states prompted outcries for swift passage of a tough,
effective voting rights bill.6 Amidst such a widespread call for strong federal
action, questions about the bill’s impact on federalism and state sovereignty
were quickly lost.7
From its relatively unassuming origins, the pre-clearance provision today
has emerged as an important – and controversial – part of the VRA. Since
1990, the remedy has been the source of most voting rights litigation in the
Supreme Court.8 In its next term, the Supreme Court will consider the
constitutionality of the pre-clearance remedy as the latest episode in its
discourse on congressional enforcement authority under the Civil Rights
Amendments.9
As the most recent renewal hearings in 2006 show, many view this
development as an unfavorable one.10
They bemoan the remedy’s
transformation from a supporting part of the original enactment into an allpurpose tool of federal enforcement today.11 According to their account, the

purpose and will not have the effect of denying or diluting the right to vote on account of race or
color.
5. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1959); J.W. PELTASON,
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
(Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1961) (describing the social and political isolation experienced by
a subset of southern federal judges who sided against southern states in civil rights cases).
7. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise
(Mar. 15, 1965) in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 281–84 (1966).
8. See S. REP. NO. 109-295, pt. IIB (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 18, 36–44, 52–53
(2006).
9. Bartlett v. Strickland, 649 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. 2007), cert. granted 76 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S.
Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-689); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (2000); Bd. of Tr.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Pamela Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two
Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.REV. 725, 730–31
(1998).
10. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (rejecting Texas’ redistricting plan as an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (rejecting
congressional redistricting predominantly motivated by race in Georgia); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993) (finding that the Constitution generally forbids redistricting that is predominantly
driven by race); Nancy K. Bannon, The Voting Rights Act: Over the Hill at Age 30?, 22 HUM.
RTS. Q. 10 (1995).
11. See, e.g, Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (J. Thomas concurring) (noting the
“sea change that has occurred in the application and enforcement” of the remedy); ABIGAIL
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purpose of pre-clearance was to supplement the litigation remedy outlined in
Section Two of the VRA.12 The more traditional brand of civil rights litigation
was supposed to be the “sword” to dismantle ongoing racial discrimination in
elections, while the pre-clearance review process served as an administrative
“shield” to stop prospective efforts to discriminate.13 Fashioning pre-clearance
as an offensive weapon departs from its initial conception as a narrow,
temporary response to election-related race discrimination.14 Today, preclearance now requires states to adopt institutional reforms that unreasonably
interfere with party competition and state sovereignty—which greatly exceeds
Congress’ vision.15
That the pre-clearance regime has transformed during its four decades of
enforcement can hardly be disputed. But this article claims that the
aforementioned “pre-clearance run amok” claim is quite mistaken for two
reasons. First, the changes in the pre-clearance system did not happen by
chance. In fact, these changes have resulted from the careful and measured
choices of two sets of political actors—Congress and the judiciary. As these
two groups repeatedly reshaped this remedy in response to new kinds of
election problems that emerged, their revisions have significantly redefined the
pre-clearance remedy.16
A second and more critical flaw of the criticism is its notion that preclearance has uniformly expanded over time. The true story of this remedy’s
development is a far more dynamic and complex tale. As this article will
explain, only certain aspects of the pre-clearance regime have broadened in
their application during the last forty years.17 Today, the remedy covers more
parts of the country and applies to a larger share of election laws and
procedures than it did in 1965. But the key component of this remedy—its
standard for reviewing changes in election law—has followed a markedly
different path. The central element of the remedy has become decidedly more
limited in its application.18
In advancing these points, this article relies on observations from the field
of political science to help explain why the evolution of pre-clearance has

THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
(Harvard University Press 1987).
12. THERNSTROM, supra note 11, at 137.
13. Id. at 190.
14. Id. at 190–91.
15. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 892 (J. Thomas concurring) (“[W]e have immersed the federal
courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory—questions judges must
confront to establish a benchmark concept of an ‘undiluted’ vote.”).
16. Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section Five of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 384 (1996).
17. See discussion infra Part III.
18. Id.
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followed such a complex path. Put simply, this provision is the product of
what may be called an interactive statutory construction – the involvement of
both Congress and the courts to provide meaning to the words in the law. The
current meaning of the statute results from the roles that both Congress and the
courts play in providing meaning to the text. In constructing the remedy, the
interaction between the two branches has both clarified and confused key
elements of the provision. As a result, parts of the remedy have become more
expansive in their application while others have become decidedly less so.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the political science model
of interactive statutory construction used to understand the role judges play in
interpreting statutes. Part II lays out the evolution of the various components of
the pre-clearance remedy using the interactive model as a guide. Finally, Part
III discusses the impact of the interactive development for pre-clearance before
briefly concluding that the institutional of the Court helps to explain why one
part of the remedy has followed a distinct path over time.
I. POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
One reason that construing statutes poses a conceptual challenge is that
multiple institutions contribute to the enterprise.19 Scholars of political science
and law often recognize that a statute’s meaning depends on the actions of
multiple officials.20 Most often, Congress begins by selecting the words
contained in statutes commanding citizens to do (or not do) certain things.
Those words hold meanings, some of which Congress explicitly defines when
it drafts and amends the text itself.21 But the particular meanings that Congress
prefers may not take effect without the consent of the President, who may veto
proposed meanings that he finds objectionable.22 Even when both of these
actors share a view about what a given enactment means, the consistent
19. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 11–14 (1986); HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN
COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999); ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13 (Amy Guttman ed., 1998);
Randal N. Graham, A Unified Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 23 Statute L. Rev. 91 (2002).
20. For a critique of the political science approach to interpretation, see Pamela Karlan &
Daniel Ortiz, Negative Political Theory, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1691 (1995).
21. SCALIA, supra note 19 at, xii, 3; Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory
Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President of the United States” who may veto the bill). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992) (arguing that legislators’
awareness that the presidential veto has the power to end the legislative process, subject only to
their ability to override a presidential veto with a supermajority vote, profoundly influences the
legislative process and the dynamics of bargaining and deliberation).
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application and interpretation of the statute depends on the work of executive
agencies and courts when they confront problems regarding statutory
meaning.23
In their work on strategic statutory interpretation, Ferejohn and Weingast
explore the judicial role in interpreting statutes. They argue that any judge’s
effort at construction poses “a practical tension between democracy and the
rule of law.”24 Because its members typically focus more on re-election than
on governance, Congress as an institution does not often ensure that legislation
follows a well-ordered, uniform set of rules.25 This is especially true where a
statute undergoes several amendments or reconciliation between both
legislative chambers. As a result, the judiciary must make sense of ambiguous
(or even contradictory) statutory language to resolve legal disputes when they
arise.26
For their part, judges select interpretive tools partly based on their own
views about legislative power.27 They may privilege the words of the statute
(as textualists might prefer),28 or they may look beyond the words to find clues
about meaning from the enacting legislature (the desire of many intentionalists
and some purposivists).29 Ferejohn and Weingast provide an assessment of
these interpretative modes based on their implications for democratic efficacy.
Importantly, the authors note that some of the court’s choices can actually
disrupt the way that Congress manages social policy through deliberative lawmaking.30
To promote greater efficacy in Congress, the authors claim, judicial
interpretation ought to acknowledge this key link between the branches. They
model interpretation as a kind of sequential interaction—a series of strategic
choices to construe a statute in anticipation of (and sometimes in reaction to)
the decisions of the other branch.31 Using the Civil Rights Act’s development
as an example, the authors show that these institutions can work in concert or
23. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
24. John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L. J. 565, 570 (1992).
25. Id.
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
27. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETION (2000).
28. Nicholas Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1614–15 (1991).
29. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13, 27–38
(1994); CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001).
30. Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 24 at 567.
31. Id.
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at cross-purposes. Just as “Congress is not always silent on how its actions
should be interpreted” by a potentially hostile judiciary or later Congress, the
authors also note that “courts have shaped their decisions in anticipation of
adverse reaction . . . from Congress.”32 Because sharply departing from
acceptable interpretations risks hasty law-making by Congress and a cost of
unpredictability in the law, a the authors find that a strategic court should adopt
interpretations that do not disturb the preferences of the legislative majority
that enacted the bill.
II. INTERACTIVE PRE-CLEARANCE DEVELOPMENT
This more dynamic approach to understanding statutory development
provides a helpful way of understanding the evolutionary experience of the
VRA’s pre-clearance remedy. As with the Civil Rights Act, Congress and the
Supreme Court have refined the application of the pre-clearance remedy since
its inception. But their involvement in this particular project has been selective
and, at times, has worked at cross-purposes. The discussion below suggests
that this relationship has differed for different aspects of the pre-clearance
regime.
In place today are expansive conceptions of the remedy’s “coverage” and
“submission” components, which the branches have mutually reinforced in
their statutory interpretations over time. On matters of where and when federal
oversight applies, Congress and the Court have entrenched a broad, expansive
view of the remedy. There are few exceptions to the general rule that
“coverage” applies fully in places that are designated by Section Four of the
VRA.
Similarly, there is shared institutional understanding on applying a robust
meaning to the requirement that covered jurisdictions submit changes in law
related to voting. Judicial and legislative constructions involving this element
have reinforced each other, with each often explicitly citing its counterpart’s
pronouncements to confirm its own reasoning. Consequently, there is great
clarity in the statute about which jurisdictions are subject to the pre-clearance
requirement and which kinds of new enactments require federal review.
Compared to these two elements of the remedy, the legal standard for
authorizing pre-clearance changes has followed a markedly different path.
While the provision’s geographical scope and subject-matter limitation have
been construed in very similar ways, the legal standard of review has become a
more contested concept. In its current incarnation, the substantive standard for
review now prohibits very few types of discriminatory changes. As the
Supreme Court has most recently described it, the standard only bans a state
change whose purpose or effect is “retrogressive” in nature. But the definition

32. Id.
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of retrogression itself provides little guidance about the kind information
relevant in this analysis.
In contrast to their cooperative effort to define the other features, Congress
and the Court have engaged in a more combative relationship with this part of
the remedy. After the initial enactment, Congress did not specifically reaffirm
its original view of the pre-clearance standard as it did with the other parts of
the remedy. In the absence of an explicit endorsement of its earlier views
about the pre-clearance standard, the judiciary was free to develop
understandings of its own. Starting in the mid 1970s, the Court began
outlining its own conception of how the review standard ought to function.
That narrow construction of this provision, which largely supports the
judiciary’s effort to limit the application of voting rights pre-clearance, largely
prevails today.
A.

The Scope of Pre-clearance

Two distinct elements in the pre-clearance provision define the scope of
this remedy: the places where the pre-clearance remedy applies (“coverage”)
and the types of local enactments requiring federal review and approval (the
“submission” requirement). With respect to legal questions about both of these
issues, the Court and Congress have interpreted the statute in an expansive
manner to assure that the pre-clearance remedy has broad application.
1. When is a Jurisdiction “Covered”?
Both the legislative and judicial constructions of the pre-clearance remedy
have promoted an expansive view about which jurisdictions in the country are
covered. Congress has approved several amendments to lengthen the remedy’s
geographic reach, and the Court has turned back various efforts to reverse this
trend. This result is unsurprising, since the statutory text itself says a great
deal about which parts of the country the law targets.33 The triggering formula
in Section Four uses objective, voting-related factors to guide this decision.
For a state or local entity to be designated for pre-clearance, federal officials
must find two things: (1) that a state’s laws contain one of a specified list of
voting prerequisites and (2) that registration and participation rates in certain

33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2000). As scholars have often noted about the drafting of this
provision, the Justice Department and Congress worked very carefully to designate those states
where these special obligations would apply. Their purposeful exclusion of politically sensitive
states like Texas (home to President Johnson), Tennessee, and Arkansas (both represented by
powerful Democratic Senators) from the oversight regime suggests that party politics played
some role in developing the provision. Nonetheless, the facially neutral criteria that drove the
formula offered an objective basis for enforcing the remedy to the fullest extent. Chandler
Davidson The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 17
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
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national elections fall below a threshold percentage of the voting age
population.
Soon after the VRA became law, the Supreme Court in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach endorsed this method of defining the remedy’s geographic scope.34
The majority specifically rejected arguments that Congress had exceeded its
authority by infringing on the sovereignty of selected states. Noting the law’s
goal to “banish the blight of discrimination in voting,” the Court found that
Section Four reasonably targeted parts of the country where violations
occurred most often—which, in 1965, was the Deep South.35 These states had
maintained a record of “intransigence, foot dragging, and sometimes overt
hostility” to court orders and litigation, which contributed to low levels of
registration and turnout.36 In light of this evidence, a geographically specific
remedy was a reasonable and permissible solution. The approval of both the
ends and means of the law marked an important consensus with Congress
about limiting the remedy to places where registration and voting problems
were most severe.
The Court’s favorable view of the triggering formula in turn supported
later efforts by Congress to broaden pre-clearance coverage in later
amendments. Congress reworked Section Four’s framework in 1970 and 1975
by updating the threshold measures of voter participation, based on more
current national elections.37 As a result, these modifications of the trigger
brought new areas of the country into the pre-clearance system. The most
significant substantive change occurred in 1975, when Congress identified
English language-based rules and procedures as pre-requisite devices that
could trigger pre-clearance coverage.38 The targeted jurisdictions captured by
this amendment were mostly in the South and Southwest, extending the
remedy’s geographic reach into new regions with different racial minority
groups.39 With Katzenbach’s endorsement of relying upon neutral factors to

34. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
35. Id. at 304.
36. Id. at 311–13.
37. See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings Before Subcomm. Number 5 of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., H.R. Rep. No. 91-397, at 3280 (1970); Joint View of Ten Members
of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 91st Cong.
5517-5520 (1970) [hereinafter Joint View]; S. Rep. No. 94-295, at 777 (1975). The Act’s
coverage provision expanded to parts of New York, Arizona, California, Wyoming, Connecticut,
New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts.
38. Joint View, supra note 37 at 5517-20. The 1970 statute based coverage on participation
during the 1968 elections, while the 1975 extension added a threshold based on state-by-state
participation during the 1972 elections.
39. See Davidson, supra note 33, at 34–37.
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guide the “coverage” designation, few in Congress doubted the propriety of
refashioning the formula to add to the roster of “covered” jurisdictions.40
This is not to say that developing the coverage formula eliminated all
possible ambiguities. Several cases before the Court tested the extent to which
coverage should apply to a targeted jurisdiction in special circumstances. But
even when it was invited to curtail the provision’s scope, the Court has largely
followed Congress’ lead in promoting a broad approach to pre-clearance
coverage. An examination of two categories of cases—those involving the
application of the provision to political subdivisions and those applying
coverage to political parties—illustrate this point well.
In United States v. Sheffield, the Court made clear that “all entities having
power over any aspect of the electoral process” in a covered state were subject
to the pre-clearance review system.41 The defendant jurisdiction in this case
was a city that adopted an at-large system for local elections through a
referendum.42 Though it did not oppose the referendum, the DOJ lodged preclearance objections to specific elements of the proposed election change.43 A
U.S. District Court dismissed a lawsuit to enforce the federal objection,
holding that Sheffield was not a “covered” jurisdiction in terms of the VRA.44
That legal conclusion turned on a reading of language in Section 14(c) of the
VRA, which arguably limited pre-clearance coverage to those subdivisions and
local entities that controlled voter registration.45
On review, Justice Brennan rejected this construction and found that the
Section 14(c) distinction was “completely irrelevant to the Act’s purposes.”46
The lower court’s “crippling” interpretation made little sense in light of
Congress’ broad statutory objectives.47 The Court’s reasoning centered instead
on Section Four, whose terms are referenced in Section Five.48 Section Four
imposed its duties on States as entire territories, “not just [on those] county
governments or units of local government that register voters.”49 Nothing in
the triggering provision suggested that coverage depended upon a jurisdiction’s
control over the registration process. Therefore, the best way of reading
Section Five, which borrows from Section Four, was that it enjoyed the same
reach.50 The competing construction, the Court continued, would have created

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Joint View, supra note 37 at 5517-20.
435 U.S. 110 (1978).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 117–18.
Id.
Id.
Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 130.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 123.
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incentives for states to evade federal review and that approach would run
counter to the entire pre-clearance system.51 If the lower court was correct,
then local governments would be free to adopt the very same discriminatory
rules that Alabama’s legislature clearly could not.52 Finally, the Court made
clear that this interpretation was warranted since Congress had effectively
ratified this view by extending the remedy on two occasions following the
decision in Katzenbach.53
The Court interpreted coverage expansively in the context of pre-clearance
“bailout” as well.54 City of Rome v. United States is perhaps better known for
upholding the constitutionality of the 1975 amendments to Section Five, but
the Court’s discussion about the scope of Section Four is noteworthy for
present purposes.55 The specific issue was whether a city located within a
covered state could independently excuse itself from pre-clearance.56 Noting
that Sheffield did not establish that a city was the same as a “state” for preclearance purposes, the majority found evidence in the 1975 legislative
hearings on the VRA showing that bailout was conceived as an all-or-nothing
proposition.57 During these sessions, both the House and Senate made clear
that localities could not pursue bailout on their own.58 In light of these
statements, the Court found no merit to the city’s plea for relief. So long as the
state remained covered by the pre-clearance regime, its subsidiary units did as
well.59
Aside from extending coverage to state and local governments, the Court
has found private entities subject to the remedy in their administration of
elections. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia recognized that parties can

51. Id. at 124–25.
52. Id.
53. Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 135 (“Here, the ‘slumbering army’ of Congress was twice
‘aroused,’ and on each occasion it re-enacted the Voting Rights Act and manifested its view that §
5 covers all cities in designated jurisdictions”) (footnote omitted).
54. “Bailout” refers to a procedure allowing a covered jurisdiction to avoid pre-clearance by
bringing a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and
proving that it has not engaged in discrimination for a designated length of time. See 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(b).
55. 446 U.S. 156, 167–68 (1980).
56. See S. Rep. No. 417 at 57, 44. This decision was effectively mooted by Congress’ preclearance extensions in 1982, but the change was reflective of a new policy rather than a rejection
of the Court’s misinterpretation. In any event, the case is important in that it offers evidence of
the Court’s adherence to a broad approach to interpreting the coverage component of preclearance.
57. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 167–68; see Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 128 (“Because the
designated jurisdiction in this case is a State, we need not consider the question of how § 5
applies when a political subdivision is the designated entity”).
58. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 169.
59. Id. at 191–92.
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wield power in ways that raise pre-clearance concerns.60 The party in that case
charged a special fee for all delegates in its nominating conventions, which
substituted for primary elections.61 In explaining why the party fell within the
scope of the Act, the Court referred to an historical analogue—the infamous
“White Primary” cases.62 The principle from those cases is that political
regulation is core a state function that is subject to Constitutional commands,
whether the state itself or its agents issue the rules.63 Since this event was the
crucial step in choosing officials, for example, Smith v. Allwright held that
blacks could not be excluded from the Texas Democratic primary.64 Virginia
similarly gave certain preferences in its general elections to nominees from the
party conventions.65 Whether or not the advantage was significant, the
delegation of power closely resembled the kind of evasive maneuvering that
pre-clearance sought to remedy. Significantly, the Court found legislative
comments suggesting that coverage was appropriate in this very same
context.66 Congress appeared to understand the linkage between parties and
elections by drafting Section 14 of the Act, which defined “voting” to include
the “selection of party officers.”67
2. What Changes Are Reviewable?
Just as Congress and the Court have construed the geographical reach of
pre-clearance expansively, they have also required states to submit a broad set
of proposed laws for federal review. Compared to the triggering formula in the
statute, the applicable text is not as clear about what types of law must be
submitted.
Section Five states that new “standard[s], practice[s], or
procedure[s] with respect to voting” are reviewable. As this language has been
construed by Congress and the Court, the submission requirement applies to an
especially large number of state enactments. Very few limitations to this rather
broad conception of the remedy’s subject matter have been recognized. On the
whole, then, there has been very little question that the federal oversight
system applies to several categories of state enactments.

60. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 205 (1996).
61. Id. at 190.
62. Id. at 199 (“In concluding that the regulation applies to the Party, we are guided by the
reasoning of Smith v. Allwright,, decided more than half a century ago.”); see also Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that the Texas Jaybird party was subject to the Fifteenth
Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (outlawing the racially selective white
primary); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating a Texas statute that denied blacks
the ability to participate in Democratic primaries).
63. Smith, 321 U.S. at 664–65.
64. Id. at 666.
65. Morse, 517 U.S. at 186–87.
66. Id. at 188.
67. Id. at 203–04.
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The broad judicial conception of the submission requirement was apparent
in the first Supreme Court case describing the types of changes subject to
federal review in the VRA.68 The plaintiffs in Allen v. State Board of Elections
challenged several rules that states had enacted without federal review.69
While all related to political participation, only one of these rules directly
affected registration and balloting. Nevertheless, the Court required review in
each instance because the pre-clearance remedy enjoyed “the widest possible
scope” in its application.70 The Court explained its position based upon the
reasoning from Katzenbach:
We must reject the narrow construction . . . to Section Five. The Voting
Rights Act was aimed at subtle, as well as obvious, state regulations which
have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.
Moreover, . . . the Act gives a broad interpretation of the right to vote,
recognizing that voting includes “all action necessary to make a vote
71
effective.

State laws bearing even the potential to do harm to the franchise even “in a
minor way” were reviewable “changes” in the pre-clearance regime.72 By
defining the franchise quite broadly, the Court established that a large number
of state laws would be closely regulated pursuant to the submission
requirement.
Congress ratified this judicial construction by extending Section Five of
the VRA in 1970.73 Due to pre-clearance enforcement, registration and
turnout rates all had significantly improved voter participation in the originally
covered states.74 However, advocates of a statutory extension concluded that
these states needed more progress. In particular, Congress noted that vote
dilution continued to limit the effectiveness of votes that were actually cast.75
Dilution did not prevent a citizen from registering or casting a ballot, but it
minimized the impact of that vote on electoral outcomes.76 Legislators relied
upon the broad conception of the pre-clearance remedy in Allen as authority
for modifying Section Five to address these more subtle and sophisticated
manipulations of the electoral system.77

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969).
Id. at 550.
Id. at 566–67.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 566.
Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-284, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
Joint View, supra note 37, at 5520.
See id. at 5520–21.
See id. at 5520.
Id. 5521.
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The Court’s endorsement of the 1970 amendment was apparent in two
particular decisions—Perkins v. Matthews and Georgia v. United States.78 In
both, the legislative hearings provided support for extending federal review to
changes with the potential to dilute the right to vote. In Perkins, for instance,
the shift in focus led the Court to find that an annexation proposal in
Mississippi was subject to federal review.79 The majority in that case
explained that a racially selective policy could abridge the franchise in two
ways. First, local officials could decide to annex only those outlying
communities where whites lived.80 Second, a racially selective annexation
would mean that votes in black communities already in the jurisdiction might
be diluted.81 Thus, the Court acknowledged the probability of vote dilution
along with that of outright denial as circumstances that create a pre-clearance
violation.82
Likewise, in Georgia, the Court invoked this rationale in rejecting a
proposal to redraw election districts.83 Georgia had not submitted a new
election district plan to federal authorities, and the state sought review on
whether a pre-clearance submission was even necessary for redistricting.84
Turning again to the 1970 legislative record, the Court found that district
drawing was one of the “standards, practices, or procedures with respect to
voting” included in Section Five.85 Redistricting could dilute votes by shifting
district lines to “pack” minority voters into a single district or to “crack” large
concentrations of these voters.86 Significant in this analysis was the
observation that none of the legislative changes conflicted with the view taken
in Allen that all policies with the potential to affect the right to vote are
reviewable.87 This point was further confirmed by the reliance upon the Allen
decision by legislators who sponsored the 1970 extension: “We can only
conclude then that Allen correctly interpreted the congressional design when it
held that “the Act gives a broad interpretation of the right to vote, recognizing
78. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379
(1971).
79. Perkins, 400 U.S. at 390–92.
80. Id. at 388.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 388–89.
83. Georgia, , 411 U.S. at 532–34.
84. Id. at 527–28.
85. Id. at 532.
86. Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE
L.J. 1021, 1041 (2005).
87. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 534 (“In the present posture of this case, the question is not
whether the redistricting of the Georgia House, including extensive shifts from single-member to
multimember districts, in fact had a racially discriminatory purpose or effect. The question,
rather, is whether such changes have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote and are
within the definitional terms of § 5. It is beyond doubt that such a potential exists.”).
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that voting includes ‘all action necessary to make a vote effective.’”88
Applying pre-clearance review in this context was perhaps a stretch, but the
legislative endorsement provided the justification. Congress recognized that
state compliance with the one person-one vote principle would require a
regular pre-clearance submission of redistricting plans.
McDaniel v. Sanchez found review appropriate for an election plan
adopted in federal court that embodied the “policy choices of [its] elected
representatives.”89 In doing so, the Court refused to create an exception to the
submission requirement where a federal court orders a “change.”90 The local
jurisdiction had altered its election system to resolve a one-person-one-vote
violation noted in a federal court’s findings.91 The remedy ultimately was part
of the court’s final order, but the details of the plan were developed and
approved by local officials.92 Over the objections of the plaintiffs in the case,
the judge enacted the plan without pre-clearance review.93 The jurisdiction
characterized the change as a federal court plan, which was not subject to the
submission requirement.94 But, the Court rejected this claim, finding that a
“covered’ jurisdiction was actually responsible for the new plan.95 Even
though the court may have limited its options, the county was responsible for
the plan’s details. Additionally, the Court found evidence in the 1975
legislative record weighing in favor of requiring review. The congressional
committee that drafted the extension expected that federal oversight would
apply in one-person-one-vote cases like these.96
In other cases, the Court pushed the bounds of the submission requirement
even farther. The “change” in Dougherty County v. White was an
administrative rule denying pay to state employees who ran for public office.97
The Court stated that this rule was a “standard, practice, or procedure” because
of the context in which this rule was adopted and because of its potential
effects on voting.98 The rule was implemented shortly after a black employee
had announced his candidacy for the state legislature.99 The odd timing cast
some doubt on the asserted reason for the rule—maintaining the sound
management of public funds. Since the rule targeted only employees engaged

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 533.
452 U.S. 130 (1981).
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 134–35.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 138.
McDaniel, 452 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 148, n.26 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 17–18 (1975)).
Dougherty County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 34 (1978).
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 34.
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in election activity, the intent to change the voting system was simple for the
Court to see.100 In addition, the Court identified two specific ways that
withholding salary in these circumstances could adversely affect minority
voters. First, the rule created an economic disincentive against candidates
pursuing public office.101 Similarly, with fewer candidates on the ballot, the
rule would narrow the choices available to the electorate.102 Its likely effects,
similar to the changes considered in Allen, were sufficiently related to the
franchise for review.103 The Court’s expansive construction seemed to apply
federal review even to more typical administrative rules.
In McCain v. Lybrand, the Court held that the submission requirement was
not open to exceptions based on administrative expediency.104 South Carolina
advanced a rather novel claim that the Attorney General had “implicitly”
approved several laws passed in 1966.105 These voting-related enactments
were enforced without a formal federal review, but the state argued the
changes were part of a later filing that the DOJ had approved.106 The Court did
not accept this excuse and enjoined the 1966 laws.107 Of course, there were
practical reasons to have taken the opposite position. In all likelihood, the DOJ
was aware of the 1966 laws when it reviewed the “omnibus” submission.
Additionally, showing lenience in this case might have avoided the
administrative problem of parsing out the elements of South Carolina’s
election system that remained valid. But the Court once again opted for the
more robust version of the submission requirement.108 The law required that
each “change” undergo an analysis of its purpose and possible effects prior to
its implementation. Ignoring this omission would have interfered with the
entire pre-clearance system.109 To be effective, the remedy depended upon full
state compliance. While the text of the statute did not clearly provide an
answer, the Court read the Act to counsel against easing submission burdens
on covered jurisdictions.110
Not until Presley v. Etowah County did the Court present a categorical
limitation on the “changes” subject to federal review.111 There, the Court held
that matters involving governance were beyond the types of vote-related rules

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Dougherty County, 439 U.S. at 43.
McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 246–47 (1984).
Brief of Appellee at 33–35, McCain v. Lybrand, No. 82-282 (Sept. 8, 1983).
Id. at 16–17.
McCain, 465 U.S. at 239.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 257.
Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 503 (1992).
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that are subject to federal review.112 One of the county governments in this
case had settled a Section Two dilution lawsuit by adopting a single-member
plan with a majority-black district.113 Voters from that district chose a black
candidate in the resulting elections, but the incumbent commissioners
undermined his authority by stripping these offices of independent power.114
Each member traditionally could decide budget and policy matters in his home
district. But the new rule made these choices subject to a majority vote
requirement, effectively isolating the lone black member.115 Even though the
design of the new system bore suspicious timing and effects, the Court found
that review was not required for this decision because it concerned
“governance” as opposed to voting.116
The logic in Dougherty County seemed to suggest that this reshuffling of
political power was a reviewable “change.” For one thing, the procedure
posed significant problems for minority candidates and their constituencies.
Voters expected their representative to enjoy certain independent powers that
were suddenly modified after the election.117 The racially charged atmosphere
that led to the lawsuit and settlement made consensus building particularly
unlikely. In addition, the context around the Commission’s sudden decision to
alter its structure seemed equally peculiar. Like Dougherty County, the facts in
Etowah County indicated that race may have played a role in the sudden policy
shift. But, the Court found that pre-clearance did not apply because the vote
did not “bear a direct relation to voting itself.”118
Presley appears to cut against the otherwise expansive trend in this area,
since the majority enumerates measures that are subject to the submission
requirement. Prior to this point, the Court had been reluctant to describe any
such limits to avoid giving states latitude to evade the law. Under this rule,
though, no proposed law is subject to review unless it has a direct connection
to voting or to elections.119 One could read this opinion as the beginning of a
judicial effort to narrow the submission rule from the seemingly boundless
version in Allen. Congress had not specifically addressed this provision since
1970, so the Court could have imposed its own interpretation. On the other
hand, the majority emphasized that its holding only summarized the rule had

112. Id. at 506.
113. Id. at 522, n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 496–97.
115. Id.
116. Presley, 502 U.S. at 507. The changes were made “less than nine months after the
county’s first black commissioner took office, were an obvious response to the redistricting of the
county that produced a majority black district from which a black commissioner was elected.” Id.
at 521–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 503–04 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 510.
119. Id.
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been applied in the past.120 To the extent that the majority meant what it said,
Presley did not purport to disturb the main point of Allen—that pre-clearance
deserved an application of the widest scope.
B.

The Legal Standard for Pre-clearance Review

As opposed to questions about where and when pre-clearance applies,
questions about the review standard have been subject to a much more
contested interpretive history. The substantive heart of the remedy is its test
for examining state voting changes. According to the statute, a violation exists
if the proposed change in law “has . . . the purpose [or] the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”121 The standard clearly
calls attention to the jurisdiction’s intent along with its potential effects on
minority voters, and importantly, the standard places the burden of proof on
Thus, a proposed change is invalid and
the covered jurisdiction.122
unenforceable in a covered state without affirmative evidence that its purpose
and effect does not “deny or abridge” the right to vote.
But, the statutory language is only as effective as its interpretation. The
evolution of this feature has been almost exclusively controlled by the
judiciary. Until the most recent renewal efforts, Congress has rarely acted to
announce its preferred view of this part of the remedy. In the absence of clear
legislative efforts, the Court has introduced novel concepts that severely limit
federal review to a single issue—retrogression. As a result, the meaning of the
pre-clearance standard has become relatively less clear and less predictable
than the other parts of the remedy.
1. Retrogression as a Concept
The way the Court has interpreted the standard for reviewing proposals is
most evident in Beer v. United States, a 1976 decision upholding election
districts in New Orleans.123 Focusing on the plan’s likely effects, the Court
reversed a trial finding that the proposed map violated the pre-clearance
standard.124 As the Court redefined the test, pre-clearance did not prohibit a
new proposal unless its effects were “retrogressive”—i.e., they reduced a

120. Id. at 501 (“We agree that all changes in voting must be pre-cleared and with Allen’s
holding that the scope of Section Five is expansive within the sphere of its operation.”).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000).
122. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). According to the Court,
Congress intended to shift the advantages of time away from the offending states and to the
federal government in these proceedings. Id.
123. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 (1976). There, black residents were about half
of the city's population in 1970, but local officials crafted only one single member district with a
population approaching a majority of voting age blacks. Id. at 134–35.
124. Id. at 136, 142.
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minority group’s pre-existing level of voting strength.125 Even though the one
redrawn district with a sizable black population was less than a majority, the
change was deemed “ameliorative” in the sense that blacks were marginally
better off than before the change.126
This construction seriously limited the remedy’s reach, especially in places
where racial discrimination was most severe. Pre-clearance would do very
little work where black political representation was most depressed. In New
Orleans, for example, local officials satisfied the standard by adopting a
minimal increase in representation.127 While it might have been an easy rule
for courts to apply in practice, the rule of retrogression was a less robust
protection than even the Justice Department had anticipated.128 Furthermore,
this analysis suggested by the Supreme Court ignored contextual evidence of
existing race discrimination. Retrogression effectively reduced the review to a
quasi-quantitative assessment of the political strength of minorities.
For all its faults, the advantage of Beer was in its predictability. However,
the Court established several exceptions to this rule in later cases. The justices
recognized an “ex necessitate” exception for local annexations.129 In City of
Richmond v. United States, the Court approved an annexation that tipped a
city’s racial balance in favor of white voters.130 Proof of retrogressive effects
was undeniable using Beer, since the black percentage of the population would
significantly diminish.131 Yet the annexation plan was deemed permissible,
despite these effects, because it “fairly reflected” black political power.132
So what was the legislative response to this somewhat novel reformulation
of the pre-clearance standard? Evidence from the legislative record developed
in 1982 suggests that the reaction was not mere acquiescence.133 Indeed, the
lack of a more concerted response is largely explained by timing. The Court
announced its decision in Beer just one year after the 1975 legislative
amendments to the VRA, which mainly left the administrative standard of
review unchanged. Likewise, the Court’s refinement of the review standard in

125. Id. at 141. Compared to the earlier district map which had carefully avoided black
majorities, the proposed plan under review slightly increased the percentage of blacks in one
district. Id. at 141–42.
126. Id. at 141.
127. See id. at 150–52, n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Drew Days, Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice, in CONTROVERSIES
IN MINORITY VOTING (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1992).
129. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 330 (2000).
130. City of Richmond Heights v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1975).
131. See id. at 363 (noting that the percentage of blacks would decline from 52% to 42%).
132. Id. at 371.
133. See infra Part II.B.2.
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City of Richmond did not lead to a specific response from Congress.134 Each of
the Court’s decisions in this area came on the heels of a legislative revision of
the pre-clearance provisions, which primarily focused on expanding the
remedy in other ways. In addition, the renewals included sunset provisions
intended in part to settle matters for a prescribed period of time. With so much
effort to craft a renewal, there was little interest in revisiting the matter to
address the Court’s view of the standard—even one that seemed in conflict
with other parts of the Act.
2. The Short-Lived Notion of Incorporation
But Congress did have an opportunity to react to the retrogression principle
in 1982. The catalyzing event for the legislative action was a Supreme Court
case holding that Section Two of the VRA only outlawed intentional
discrimination135—a position that many believe was inconsistent with the
original intent of the 1965 statute.136 Sponsors in Congress therefore pushed
for specific changes in the statutory text to make clear that either a
discriminatory purpose or a disparate effect would violate the law in most
cases.137 Even though most of the legislative proceedings focused on the
language and application of Section Two’s application in vote dilution cases,
there is significant evidence in the record showing that legislators believed that
these modifications would at least indirectly encourage a less restrictive
understanding of the pre-clearance standard.138
During the hearings on the amendments, committee reports adopted in both
chambers endorsed the idea that a pre-clearance objection was appropriate
anytime a proposed change in law violated the Constitution or Section Two of
the Voting Rights Act.139 This conception of the remedy imposes a more
exacting standard of the review standard than Beer suggests, since it adds an
additional level of analysis. Even some non-retrogressive proposals might still
fail under a standard that examines whether a plan whose results are racially
dilutive. In other words, a new plan might fail if its adoption would lead to a
lawsuit under Section Two. To be sure, the statements from the floor debates
are entirely uniform in their endorsement of this incorporation theory, which is
at least partially due to the need for compromise in a divided government.140
Nevertheless, the theory described in these reports indicates that Congress
134. Thomas R. Morris & Neil Bradley, Virginia, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 271
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman 1994).
135. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 465 U.S. 55, 61 (1980).
136. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 17 (1982).
137. Id. at 27–29.
138. H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 34–35 (1982); see also 128 CONG. REC. 14,312-13 (June 18,
1982).
139. H.R. REP. 97-227, at 33 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1981).
140. See generally, H.R. REP. 97-227, (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1981).
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might not have simply accepted or endorsed the Court’s formulation of the
standard in Beer.141
Whether or not Congress intended to incorporate Section Two analysis into
the pre-clearance standard in 1982, the Supreme Court summarily rejected this
approach in its later cases. Holding to its Beer formulation, the majority has
explained that the VRA’s provisions embody distinct functions that require
different approaches.142 Where Section Five is concerned, retrogression
analysis remains the controlling inquiry.
The Court emphasized this functional distinction in Holder v. Hall, where
it dismissed a Section Two lawsuit to increase the size of a governing body.143
Minority voters tried to analogize their claim to the pre-clearance review,
which applied to the size of a jurisdiction.144 The Court rejected this approach
because there was no reasoned basis of comparison. Review under Section
Two requires comparing the challenged system to an ideal one.145 But Section
Five’s standard review only requires an analysis of the current system and the
proposed change.146
The Court formally discarded the idea of incorporation in the first review
of Reno v. Bossier Parish.147 There, the DOJ had objected to a school district
plan because of a likely violation of Section Two.148 The majority first
remanded and later upheld the plan, finding that the DOJ had exceeded its
power under the pre-clearance provision.149 Noting the various procedural
distinctions in the review process, the Court concluded that the Section Five
inquiry was designed to be limited.150 While relevant to a pre-clearance
inquiry, evidence of vote dilution (a concern under Section Two) cannot itself
provide the basis for finding a violation under the standard
3. The Racial Gerrymandering Cases
The Court’s narrow approach is also evident in its racial gerrymandering
cases, which outlaw district drawing that it is predominantly motivated by
race.151 The majority’s analysis focused on the 14th Amendment, but these

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
(1993).

See generally, H.R. REP. 97-227, (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1981).
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000).
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885 (1994).
Id. at 882.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 883.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 339–40.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 490; see Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 339–40.
See Bossier Parish, 528 U.S. at 329, 335.
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643–44
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cases just as strongly rely upon its adherence to the retrogression principle.152
The states in these cases had drawn multiple black-majority districts partly to
avoid a threatened pre-clearance objection.153 The Court acknowledged that
complying with the VRA was a compelling state interest, but such compliance
did not require maximizing the number of black-majority districts.154 Put
another way, the DOJ was not allowed to use its pre-clearance power to force
states to adopt a specific number of majority-black districts. In Miller v.
Johnson, for instance, the DOJ had no reason to encourage Georgia to draw
more than the two majority black districts in its original plan.155 The state’s
earlier plan was not retrogressive, the Court implied, because it featured one
more of these districts than the state had in 1980.156
The aforementioned cases all applied the retrogression test in cases
involving likely alleged discriminatory effects. The Court has also employed
retrogression to analyze plans that might violate the pre-clearance standard due
to a discriminatory purpose. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Reno II)
upheld a school board plan even though local officials openly refused to draw
even one majority-black district to help accommodate its thirty percent black
population.157
Reasoning from Beer, Justice Scalia claimed that applying the principle
parallel construction of statutes mandated this outcome.158 The “purposes”
prohibited in the provision had to be identical to the kind of “effects” that were
barred—meaning only retrogressive ones.159 Thus, a jurisdiction’s goal of
renewing its existing plan—even an unconstitutional one—did not violate the
Although it took great pains to harmonize this
review standard.160
interpretation with other prior holdings, the majority did not appeal to the
legislative hearings to support its position.161 As in Beer, the jurisdiction’s
poor history of minority representation immunized its changes from close
review.162 In sharp contrast to the vigorous enforcement scheme suggested by
152. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996) (There, the Court made clear that
nonretrogression simply required “that the minority’s opportunity to elect representatives of its
choice not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State’s actions”).
153. See e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 906-07; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 651.
154. Miller, 515 U.S. at 910.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 923.
157. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 323, 326, 341 (2000).
158. Id. at 336.
159. Id. at 328–29 (“[W]e refuse to adopt a construction that would attribute different
meanings to the same phrase in the same sentence, depending on which object it is modifying”).
160. Id. at 336.
161. Rather, the Court justified its position based on the structural claim that sections 2 and 5
of the Act were analytically distinct and have applications that do not overlap. Id. at 342–43
(Souter, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 341–42.
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Allen, this holding requires the federal reviewer to overlook violations of
Section Two or even the Constitution itself.
4. Retrogression Redux
The campaign to rein in pre-clearance review by judicial interpretation
reached new heights in Georgia v. Ashcroft, whose holding only purported to
define the “effective exercise of the franchise.”163 In fact, the Court relaxed
the pre-clearance standard to the point that dissenters in the case wondered
whether anything was left of the review standard.164 Under this latest gloss on
retrogression, states can intentionally eliminate existing majority-minority
districts without causing a violation. That is, the Court endorsed a change that
clearly reduces existing minority voting strength (which seemed exactly what
retrogression says is barred).165
The district court reviewed the plan in question and denied pre-clearance,
primarily because the state had substituted black majorities with “influence”
districts.166 The new districts contained fewer blacks than their predecessors,
and they were located in different parts of the state. The panel also pointed out
that even if blacks enjoyed an “equal opportunity to elect” candidates overall
(as Georgia’s evidence arguably showed), the plan was retrogressive because
fewer seats were under the control of black voters than was true under the old
plan.167
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had misapplied the
retrogression standard.168 The correct inquiry was whether Georgia had
retrogressed in the totality of circumstances.169 This time, the majority’s
reasoning rested neither on an analysis of the statutory text nor on Congress’
intent but on a political theory.170 While not the same as controlling elections,
political influence can be an important alternative basis of political
representation for minority groups.171 For this reason, a court should not
discount or ignore the benefits gained from districts with less than a black

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003).
Id. at 495 (Souter, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 470, 474.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 477.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 479–80.
Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 482.
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majority.172 In the majority’s view, the new plan likely complied with Section
Five.173
III. DISCUSSION
The preceding sections have made the case that interpreting the preclearance remedy has not been uniformly expansive. Contrary to the view of
some critics, the evolution of this provision has been more complicated.
Whereas some features of the remedy have been construed in an expansive
manner, the central part of the remedy—the standard of review—has followed
a very different trajectory. The federal judiciary has consistently employed a
narrow interpretation of this standard to outlaw only a small subset of
discriminatory state practices. Unlike the construction of the first two features,
the substantive test for pre-clearance violation has not involved the kind of
mutual reinforcement that would entrench a clear meaning. Either due to
Congress’ purposeful ambiguity or its insufficient action, the courts have
remained dominant in shaping the provision, and their view has been decidedly
narrow compared to the way the other parts of the remedy have been read.
This section places these observations in context, relying on the interactive
theory of statutory construction discussed earlier. At its core, the judiciary’s
role in shaping the standard of review is explainable by the role that this
feature plays in the VRA along with the court’s strategic considerations about
how Congress might react to its retrogression principle.
The judicial emphasis on controlling the standard of review is not
especially surprising given the nature of the provision. The process of
assessing a pre-clearance violation closely resembles the kind of adjudication
that the judges employ in common law cases. Courts have a comparative
advantage over legislatures in developing the kinds of tests applied in a variety
of circumstances. Unlike legislatures, the courts are also able to refashion
these tests in light of new observations. The expertise in elaborating on an
existing standard partly explains the judiciary’s more active role in construing
this part of the statute.
However, this trend is also explainable by the court’s strategic
considerations in advancing its construction of the review standard. The key
moment in the development of this standard was when the judiciary adopted
the retrogression principle in Beer.174 Nothing in the previous legislative
enactments of the VRA, either the legislative history or the statutory text,

172. Id. at 482–83. The most contested aspect of this holding, though, concerned the opinions
of black state legislators who supported this plan. The Court found that their opinions were
"relevant"—though not dispositive—evidence favoring approval. Id. at 471, 484.
173. Id. at 487.
174. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
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indicated that Congress anticipated such a narrow construction.175 But the
judiciary found that the interpretive choice was compatible with its own sense
of how pre-clearance ought to work in practice. If Congress favored a broader
conception for the provision, then they had the authority to enact it.
Ironically, Congress did not remain entirely silent on whether this
interpretation of the provision was correct. While it did not address the
retrogression issue with new statutory language that rejected the prior
interpretation, the legislative record from 1982 supported a broader view of the
standard than Beer described.176 Of course, the statements from legislative
committee reports were not the same as new statutory text. Thus, this kind of
evidence would only be persuasive to a judiciary willing to cede their preferred
interpretation to a less robust display of legislative intent. Their reaction was
to maintain (and, at times, expand) the retrogression analysis in later cases.
Aside from carving out narrow exceptions to the principle in selected cases, the
Court employed the retrogression test to deny or limit pre-clearance
enforcement in redistricting cases as well as discriminatory intent cases.
Without a contrary view expressed in the form of a statutory override of
Beer, the judiciary found no basis to depart from its conception of the preclearance standard. The Court might be criticized for failing to weigh the 1982
congressional committee findings more seriously in their analysis, but their
decision is not without foundation. Congress clearly did adopt new statutory
language to override a contrary judicial construction of Section Two of the Act
in the renewal,177 making the absence of similar changes in reaction to Beer
much more meaningful. By signaling its inability or unwillingness to commit
to a particular view of the remedy, the Court had no incentive to alter their
approach to the provision. Consequently, the judiciary relied far less on text
and the legislative history in analyzing future cases. Instead, the Court spent
much more energy on assuring that its decisions would remain compatible with
their own view of the standard.

175. See id. at 139–41.
176. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 97-227 (1981); S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1981).
177. H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 2 (1981); see generally S. REP. NO. 97-41
7 (1981).

